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This conference is, in part, an expression of respect for JosephRaz and hiswork from
which we have all learned much. I thought it apt, then, to talk about Raz's (2001)
views about respect as developed in chapter four of Value, Respect, and Attachment.
Raz describes his views as having a Kantian origin. This might raise the eyebrow
of some neoKantians or anyone inclined to interpret Kant as a formalist or as
a constructivist. Nevertheless, I believe that Raz's views and Kant's, properly
interpreted and developed, have more in common than even Raz suspects. To bring
this out, I will take up three questions that Raz raises concerning Kant's doctrine:
• Why is there no analogue of the feeling of respect in Kant's treatment of
theoretical reason? (section 2)
• What is the proper object of respectthe moral law or people considered as
ends in themselves? (section 3)
• How could people be ends, let alone ends in themselves, if ends are states of
aairs intentionally brought about by action (section 4)
In his discussion of Kant, Raz sets aside the phenomenal/noumenal distinction,
and I will follow him in this. Some of the limitations of this procedure will be
discussed in the nal section.
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2 Why Is ThereNoAnalogue of Respect in Theo
retical Reason?
Raz claims that there is a puzzling asymmetry between Kant's treatment of theo
retical and practical reason:
. . . Kant treats practical reasondierently fromtheoretical reason. There
is no analogue to respect in his treatment of theoretical reason. But if
reason can determine the will to believe one thing or another, with no
special feeling of respect being invoked, why can it not determine the
will to will one thing or another without such feeling? (Raz, 2001,
1323)
One asymmetry that Kant postulates between theoretical and practical reason
is the dierent philosophical challenges they pose. In the theoretical case, Kant
argues that pure reason has a tendency to exceed its proper limits and thus involve
itself with the antinomies. In contrast, in the case of practical reason, it is empirical
and not pure practical reason, at the prompting of inclination, that tends to exceed
proper limits, especially when the moral law and its basis in the nature of persons
is unclear to us. Perhaps the focus on the feeling of respect in Kant's account of
practical reasoning is a reection of the moral and philosophical challenges posed
by our empirical natures.
Inclination is that aspect of our empirical nature that is the source of these moral
and philosophical challenges. In a note in the Groundwork, Kant denes inclination
as `the dependence of the faculty of desire on feeling' (G 4:414n). That is not
terribly helpful, but, in later work, Kant explains further.
Kant divides the mind's powers into three faculties (KU 5:198):
• The faculty of cognition
• The faculty of feeling
• The faculty of desire
The faculty of desire is the mind's capacity to produce an object by means of a
representation. It stands midway between the faculties of cognition and feeling
in that it depends on each: Desiring an object involves having a representation of
an object accompanied by a feeling of pleasure. In empirical desire, the feeling
of pleasure is the contingent eect of the representation of the object impinging
on one's faculty of feeling. When an empirical desire becomes habitual, it is an
inclination.
Following Hume, Kant holds that the regular operation of habit occurs unre
ectively. However, when a person reects and judges that pleasure is regularly
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connected with an object, a person takes an interest in that object. Thus awareness
of an inclination produces an interest in the object (G 4:413). When an interest
arises from inclination it is a pathological interest. Interest, however, can arise from
rational grounds as well. When it does, it is a practical interest.
Like Hume, Kant claims that all action involves desire. Unlike Hume, Kant
claims that not all desire is empirical. Even in circumstances where the objects of
inclination are grounds for action, it is reason that determines whether this is so.
Rational beings view their empirical desires as potential grounds of rational choice.
Pure desires, in contrast, are not grounds of rational choice, even potentially, but
are noncognitive responses to these grounds. Thus a person acts from duty, not
because he antecedently wants to; rather, a person desires to do his duty because
he recognizes the reasons he must. The interest in the moral law involved in acting
from duty is practical, not pathological. The desire in acting from duty is pure, and
the feeling involved in this pure desire is the feeling of respect.
Kant's talk of the feeling of respect can mislead. Respect is not, or not merely, a
feeling. It is also a way of treating people (as ends in themselves and never merely as
means). The feeling of respect is part of the noncognitive response to the reasons
there are for such treatment.
The asymmetry that Raz observes between theoretical and practical reason is the
consequence of:
• Kant's conception of desire as a representation of its object accompanied by
a feeling of pleasure,
• Kant's subscription to the Humean claim that all action proceeds from desire,
and
• Kant's claim the determination of judgment does not involve desire in the way
that the determination of the will does.
One might disagree with the postulation of this asymmetry (see Raz, 2000, 2001;
Scanlon, 1998), but it is not particularly puzzling.
An important observation about pure desire forestalls one potential source of
disagreement. Kant understands the Humean claim that all action proceeds from
desire as a psychological and not a normative claim. It is a claim about the psychology
of practical deliberation and not a claim about what reasons there are. Pure desires
are noncognitive responses to a person's reasons as he understands them to be.
They are a response to what reasons there are and not themselves reasons for
action. So doubts about the extent to which desires could be reasons for action are
no embarrassment for at least this aspect of Kantian moral psychology.
If pure desires are not sources of reasons then why are they psychologically
necessary? In subsection 4.4, we will see that pure desires play an important
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explanatory role in the motivational psychology of a virtuous sensibility. As we will
see, this is morally, as well as psychologically, signicant.
3 What Is theObject of Respect?
In a long note in section one of the Groundwork Kant seems to claim that the
fundamental object of respect is the moral law and that persons are only objects
of respect derivatively, as exemplars of the law. Raz complains, however, that Kant
does not always adhere to his ocial explanation, particularly, when he claims that
persons are ends in themselves and must always be treated as such and never merely
as a means:
The two grounds of respect (i.e., people exemplifying the moral law by
following it, and people being ends in themselves) are quite dierent
and could lead to dierent reasons for action. However, for Kant the
two converge, and so the slippage in meaning is easy to overlook. (Raz,
2001, 136)
The two grounds of respect are conceptually independent, so there is some justice
to his worry that they might ground independent reasons for action. Whether they
do as Kant understands them, however, depends on details of their role in Kant's
system. I must confess, however, that I nd the charge of a slippage in meaning
unfair. Perhaps Kant is proposing a substantive identication. Perhaps respect for
the moral law just is respect for persons considered as ends in themselves.
Before resolving this issue, let's rst complicate it by considering Kant's contro
versial views about the illegitimacy of interpersonal moral comparisons (see Wood,
1999, chapter four, section six).
Kant writes:
Fontenelle says: `I bow to a great man, but mymind does not bow.' I can
add: before a humble plain man, in which I perceive an uprightness of
character in greater measure than I am conscious of in myself, my mind
bows whether I choose or not, however high I may carry my head in
order that he may not forget my superiority. Why? His example holds
a law before me which strikes down my self conceit when I compare my
own conduct with it. (KpV 5:7677)
On a casual reading, this passage is an expression of humility given a compari
son between Kant and the humble plain man. However, Kant is making no such
comparison. When Kant acknowledges the uprightness of the humble plain man,
he recognizes the emptiness of his selfconceit and experiences humility when he
compares his conduct with the moral law. Kant is reinterpreting moral judgments
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we make comparing ourselves with others as judgments comparing ourselves with
the moral law.
This can seem like a theoretical commitment taken to the extreme. Kant's
doctrine that the object of respect is the moral law leads him to reinterpret inter
personal moral comparisons familiar from everyday life. Kant is indeed engaged in
a revision of, if not the moral judgments we make, then at least our understanding
of them. But there is a distinctively moral, and not merely theoretical, point to
this revisiona moral point that makes it plain that Kant is indeed making the
substantive identication that I claim he is.
The moral point has positive and negative aspects.
The positive aspect concerns the absolute dignity of humanity. Being absolute,
the dignity of rational beings is equal. Kant takes this consequence very seriously.
According to Kant, the serpent spoke truly to Eve, when he claimed that by eating
the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil they would become equal to God.
In gaining practical reason (knowledge of good and evil), Adam and Eve become
equal to God in the sense that every rational being has equal and absolute worth
(MA 8:115). The ban on interpersonal moral comparisons is the expression of the
dignity of humanity which is absolute and hence equal between rational beings.
The negative aspect concerns a diagnosis of human wrongdoing. Like Hume,
Kant takes it for granted that we all more or less know right from wrong. How
ever, they dier in their attitudes towards human natureHumean cheerfulness is
counterbalanced by Kantian suspicion. On Kant's view, we are locked in a struggle
between competing conceptions of our value.
On the one hand, we are rational beings and thus endowed with the capacity of
free rational choice. Our free reason enjoins us to show equal respect for the dignity
of all humanity and constrains us to act on principles capable of uniting all human
ends into a harmonious system. Our free reason is the source of a conception of our
value based on the absolute dignity of our common humanity.
On the other hand, we are nite beings and thus subject to inclination and need.
Inclination and need are the source of both our mutual interdependence andmutual
hostility. Kant, inspired byRousseau, describes this as our `unsocial sociability'. This
unsocial sociability is the source of a conception of our value based on competition
and comparative advantage.
These conceptions of our value are not only distinct but practically conict as
well. Specically, our unsocial sociability is the source of the continual temptation
to make exceptions for ourselves to universal moral principles to the advantage of
inclination. (See 4.4 for more discussion of this.) So the ban on interpersonal moral
comparisons is due, in part, to the fact that interpersonal comparative judgments
are a mode of thinking and evaluation rooted in a misconception of our value that
is the source of human wrongdoing.
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What seems to us to be a curious focus on the moral law is, by Kant's lights, at
once the expression of respect for the dignity of humanity and a condemnation of
an alternative and misconceived conception of our value based on competition and
comparative advantage. Thus, respect for the moral law just is respect for persons
considered as ends in themselves.
Indeed, this identication is implicit in Kant's account of his encounter with
Rousseau:
I am an inquirer by inclination. I feel a consuming thirst for knowledge,
the unrest which goes with the desire to progress in it, and satisfaction
with every advance in it. There was a time when I believed this con
stituted the honor of humanity, and I despised the people, who know
nothing. Rousseau set me right about this. The blinding prejudice dis
appeared. I learned to honor human beings, and I would nd myself
more useless than the common laborer if I did not believe that this
attitude of mine can give worth to all others in establishing the rights of
humanity. (Ak 20:44)
The rst thing to notice is that this account is a conversion narrativeKant was
lost but now is found, was blind but now can see. As a conversion narrative, it
selfconsciously reports an experience that aords a moral insight so profound that
it forever transforms Kant's character. The moral insight at the heart of Kant's
conversion motivates his later theoretical articulation of it. Prior to his encounter
with Rousseau's work, Kant conceived of his selfworth in terms of his comparative
intellectual advantage over others. Afterwards, his conception of his value and the
value of others is transformed. He would be lower than the common laborer that he
formerly despised for ignorance if he did not acknowledge and act on behalf of the
equal rights of all humanity. Kant's irony here is pointedhe rejects a conception of
his value based on comparison and ranking in favor of a value shared unconditionally
and without limitation by all. Kant is a radical egalitarianthe dignity of humanity
is equal not only in the sense that it is shared by all but also in the sense that its
value is incomparable. Regarding the value of humanity as an object of comparison
dishonors humanity`The opinion of inequality makes people unequal. Only the
teaching of M. R can bring it about that even the most learned philosopher with his
knowledge holds himself, uprightly and without the help of religion, no better than
the common human being.' (Ak 20:176). Proper respect for humanity requires
that one only compare one's conduct with the moral law and not with the conduct
of other rational beings. Respect for the moral law just is respect for persons
considered as ends in themselves.
One might object as follows: To be sure, the dignity of humanity, being absolute,
is equal, in the sense that it is shared unconditionally and without limitation by
all rational beings. But the moral or inner worth of human beings varies from one
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individual to anotherthere are saints and sinners among us. If inner worth can so
vary why can't this be acknowledged by an explicit comparative judgment?
Comparison of inner worth would only be possible if there were a common
standard by which to judge. According to Kant, however, there is no such common
standard and so no such comparison is possible.
A person's inner worth is not a matter of their acting in conformity with duty;
rather, it is amatter of their acting from duty in the absence of positive inclination or
in the face of contrary inclination. However, temperament and inclination can vary
fromone person to another and operate in contingent circumstances perhaps unique
to that individual. This makes themoral challenges facing individuals incomparable:
Who knows what drove him to it? Perhaps with his temperament what
he did was no worse than a triing misdeed would be for a person with
mine? (VE 27:418)
How may people who have lived long and guiltless lives may not be
merely fortunate in having escaped many temptations? (MS 6:392393)
The standard by which to judge the inner worth of an individual is the specic
challenges he faces in acting as the moral law directschallenges that arise from
temperament and inclination operating in historically conditioned, contingent cir
cumstances. These, however, vary from person to person, and if they do, there is
no common standard to form the basis of moral comparison.
Is human character really unique in this way? It seems at least logically possible
that two individuals could have the same conguration of inclinations operating in
qualitatively identical circumstances. (Consider the striking similarity in charac
ter and biography of identical twins separated at birth.) One might nevertheless
concede that the moral challenges facing individuals are de facto unique. (Compare
Raz's, 2001, chapter one, discussion of the de facto uniqueness of our personal at
tachments.) The de facto uniqueness of our moral challenges suces to make moral
comparisons practically, if not logically, impossible. Even so, one may wonder to
what degree the moral challenges vary from person to person. Perhaps the dier
ences are only slight, at least for the vast majority of persons. However, for Kant,
this question is destined to remain open, for he consistently maintains that human
character is ultimately unknowable, at least to its full extent. So even if there were
an approximate standard sucient for rough and ready comparisons of inner worth,
we could not know it. The moral challenges facing an individual are unknowable, no
common standard is available, and hence no comparison of inner worth is possible.
Kant's categorical ban on interpersonal moral comparisons is controversial, even
for those sympathetic to his egalitarianism and his accommodation of human di
versity. Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing how radically dierent Kantian egal
itarianism is from contemporary distributive egalitarianism. As a representative,
consider Cohen's statement of that doctrine:
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I take for granted that there is something which justice requires people
to have equal amounts of, not no matter what, but to whatever extent is
allowed by values which compete with distributive equality; and I study
what a number of authors who share that egalitarian view have said
about the dimension(s) or respect(s) in which people should be made
more equal, when the price in other values of moving toward greater
equality is not intolerable. (Cohen, 1989, 906 )
Equality is conceived to be a structural feature of states of aairsan egalitarian
state of aairs is one in which people are in certain respects equal. This structural
feature of states of aairs is intrinsically valuableit is good that people are in
these respects equal. The value of equality makes it intelligible to promote states
of aairs with this structure, and the reasons it grounds are to be balanced against
the reasons grounded in other values to be promoted (compare Nagel, 1979). So
understood, judgments of equality and inequality are explicitly comparativethey
are judgments about the respects in which it would be good that people be made
equal. Like contemporary distributive egalitarians, Kant claims that, at least in
certain circumstances, gross inequalities in civic society are unjust, but his grounds
for this judgment are radically dierent from Cohen's. The injustice is due to the
grossly unequal distribution contravening, in those circumstances, the dignity of
humanity and not due to the intrinsic value of an egalitarian distribution. Thus
the values that they appeal to are dierent since they inhere in dierent things
in the structure of a distribution and in rational nature, respectively. By Kant's
lights, in taking the value of an egalitarian distribution, in circumstances where it is
genuinely valuable, to be grounded in its abstract structure rather than the nature
of its recipients, Cohen mistakes an impartial value for an impersonal value (see
Rawls 1971, section thirty, andMunozDardé 2005). Not only do Kant and Cohen
appeal to dierent values, but the nature of these values themselves dier: Whereas
the value of an egalitarian distribution may be balanced against the value of other
goods, the value of humanity is incomparable.
Kant would regard contemporary distributive egalitarianism as a morally abhor
rent doctrine, quite literally an aront to humandignity. Specically, its fundamental
mode of evaluation dishonors humanity by making it an object of comparison in a
manner incompatible with its dignity. Moreover, this comparative form evaluation
is rooted in a misconception of our value that is the source of wrongdoing. Given
his suspicious attitude towards human nature, Kant might even endorse Nietzsche's
view that egalitarianism, so understood, is the expression of ressentiment. In for
tunate circumstances, where everyone has more than enough, not only to survive
but to ourish, but not everyone has the same, what other motive could there be
for complaint? Whether or not one nds Kant's views plausible, this serves as
a vivid reminder how dierently we interpret the Enlightenment ideals of liberté,
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égalité, fraternité than the authors of these ideals. We may well wonder whether this
constitutes a genuine advance in our thinking.
4 HowCould People be Ends?
Kant's Formula of Humanity reads:
So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or that of
another, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. (G
4:429; 4:436)
The Formula of Humanity is intended as a general characterization of impermis
sible action. More than that, it purports to provide a substantive explanation of
impermissible action in terms of a distinctive kind of value that people enjoy. Part
of the power of the Formula of Humanity consists in this explanatory ambition.
Indeed the descriptive and explanatory ambitions are linked. The Formula of Hu
manity is not a general characterization of impermissible action in the sense that it
provides a mechanical algorithm from which more specic duties may be derived.
Rather, the Formula of Humanity is a general characterization of impermissible
action in the sense that it species the substantive value that grounds our duty.
The Formula of Humanity resonates with many people, not all of them Kantians.
Yet despite the emotional power of the formula, its content can prove elusive. Let
me begin by raising some questions concerning it, not all of which I can hope to
answer fully here.
One obstacle to interpretation, as Raz observes, is unclarity about how people
could be ends, let alone ends in themselves:
I can make it my end to get people jobs, or to see it that they come to
no harm, or to insure them a comfortable income, or to keep them from
temptation, and so on. But can they themselves, rather than securing
them something, be my end? (Raz, 2001, 144)
To get a person a job is to bring about a certain state of aairsthat the person
is employed. And so it is with all of Raz's other exampleseach is a potential if
nonexistent state of aairs that a person intends to bring about by action. However,
while peoplemay gure in states of aairs, people are not themselves states of aairs.
So it is hard to understand how people could be ends, let alone ends in themselves,
if an end is a state of aairs intentionally brought about by action.
Unclarity about how people could be ends might encourage an interpretation of
the formula that focuses on its second halfthe injunction to treat people never
merely as a means.
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A natural way of developing this idea is as follows: If there are limitations on how
we deal with people not derivable from their potential use for our own ends, then
people must have noninstrumental valuepeople must possess an intrinsic, nonin
strumental value that grounds what reasons there are for limiting our treatment of
them. And if these limitations may not be overridden, then it can seem that we
have capturedmuch of what Kantmeant by describing people as ends in themselves.
(Nozick's, 1974, notion of a side constraint oers just such interpretation.)
Raz makes three important criticisms of this interpretation.
First, from the fact that there are limitations on how we deal with people not
derivable from their potential use for our own ends, it follows that they have
intrinsic, noninstrumental value. It does not, however, follow that they are ends
in themselves. Purposeless actions, such as expressive actions, are Raz's example.
If it is intelligible in some circumstance for me to kick the table in exasperation,
then kicking the table must have some value not derivable from my purpose in
kicking the table for it has none, but there is no plausible interpretation of ends in
themselves in which such actions qualify.
Second, the idea that there are limitations on our treatment of people that may
not be overridden is controversial, and it is natural to want an explanation of this
feature rather than merely taking it for granted.
This leads to Raz's third, and most fundamental, criticism. The present inter
pretation purports to explain the nature of ends in themselves in terms of the
permissible forms of treatment of people. But this is to abandon the explanatory
ambition of the Formula of Humanity. The notion of an end in itself is supposed to
be the grounds of such treatment in the sense that in explains and renders intelligible
that certain forms of treatment are permissible or impermissible. In order to explain
and render intelligible the permissibility or impermissibility of forms of treatment,
the nature of ends in themselves must be specied, at least in part, independently
of such treatment.
To Raz's three criticisms let me add a fourth. Not only has the explanatory
ambition of the Formula of Humanity been abandoned, but so has its descriptive
ambition. The formula is meant to be a general characterization of permissible
and impermissible treatment of people. It is a general characterization in the sense
that it species the substantive value that explains and renders intelligible that
certain forms of treatment of people are permissible or impermissible. But the
present interpretation takes the permissible and impermissible treatment of people
as antecedently understood and explains the nature of ends in themselves in terms
of such treatment. It accomplishes none of what Kant hoped to achieve.
This is not the only possible interpretation of the injunction to never treat people
merely as a means. Perhaps we can do better. Scanlon (2004) observes that one
obstacle to such an interpretation is that treating people merely as a means seems
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to characterize a particular class of wrongs. `You were just using me!' seems to be a
charge with a particular moral force not appropriate to all forms of wrongdoing. If
someone is drowning and you walk buy without pulling a lever which would summon
the emergency services, you have wronged that person, to be sure, but you have not
used that person, at least not in the ordinary sense. Again, the descriptive ambition
of the Formula of Humanity has been frustrated, at least in its full generality.
An important observation about the injunction never to treat people merely as
means is the essential role of the qualier `merely'. As H.J. Paton (1946) long ago
observed, the Formula of Humanity does not forbid our using another person as a
means. When you buy a stamp from a postal clerk you are using the postal clerk
as a means for acquiring that stamp despite the clerk's evident humanity, but you
have done no wrong. Paton's observation generalizeswithout the qualication the
Formula ofHumanity would forbid all cooperative activity, but that is an implausible
and unintended consequence.
This observation is the basis of a fundamental diculty for any interpretation of
the Formula of Humanity that seeks to escape the unclarity of conceiving of people
as ends by focusing on the second half of the formula. When you buy a stamp from
a postal clerk you are using the postal clerk as a means for acquiring that stamp
despite the clerk's evident humanity, but you have done no wrong. Rather, what
is forbidden is omitting to treat a person `at the same time as an end.' Thus the
injunction to treat people `nevermerely as ameans' is redundant: Themoral content
of the Formula ofHumanity consists entirely in the injunction to treat people as ends
in themselves. So the unclarity that Raz nds in conceiving people as ends must be
squarely faced.
4.1 Ends
I believe that this unclarity is due to an overly narrow construal of an end.
It is natural and appropriate to speak of a state of aairs intentionally brought
about by action as the end of that action. So in writing the candidate a reference,
having an informal word with potential employers, and so on, the end of my action
is a state of aairsthat the person is employed. However, this does not entail
that all ends are states of aairs intentionally brought about by action nor is this
latter claim true. A state of aairs is the end of a person's action insofar as that
person acts for the sake of bringing about that state of aairs. So in writing a
candidate a reference, having an informal word with potential employers, and so on,
one performs these actions for the sake of bringing about a certain state of aairs,
that the person is employed. Fundamentally, ends are that for the sake of which we
act (or refrain from acting). Sometimes we act for the sake of bringing about some
state of aairs, but this is not inevitable. We can, for example, act for the sake of
preserving our continued existence and wellbeing, but our continued existence and
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wellbeing, if these are things genuinely to be preserved, already exist. Thankfully, in
normal circumstances, at least for academics in theWest, these are things which we
need not actively pursue. Nevertheless, even in such sanguine circumstances, they
set limits on the ends which we can reasonably adopt (see Korsgaard, 1996).
Can people be ends in this broader and more fundamental sense? Of course. A
parent can act for the sake of his child by providing for the child's education. In
providing for the child's education, the parent acts for the sake of the child. The
child is, in this broader sense, the end of the parent's action. In general, to act for
the sake of something is to suppose that thing has a value that grounds a reason that
renders intelligible your so acting.
4.2 Ends in Themselves
What kind of value do people manifest that makes them ends in themselves? Kant
entertains the following answer:
But suppose there were something the existence of which in itself has
an absolute worth, something which as an end in itself could be a ground
of determinate laws; then in it, and in it alone, would lie the ground of
a possible categorical imperative, that is, of a practical law. (G 4:428)
Kant is supposing the existence of something with three evaluative features:
• It is an end in itself
• It is an existent end
• It has absolute worth
Let's consider these in turn.
First, Kant is supposing the existence of something that is an end in itself. An
end in itself is something whose value is unconditional, independent of inclination,
and valid for all rational beings. Kant contrasts ends in themselves with relative
ends, ends whose value is conditional, dependent on inclination, and varies from
one rational being to another. Relative ends could only the grounds of hypothetical
imperatives (G 4:428). Conditional values are not good unconditionally but are
only good under certain conditions; under dierent conditions, they can be without
value or even bad. Even secondary virtues such as moderation, selfcontrol, and
calm reection, can be extremely evil if used by a bad will (as when the coolness
of a scoundrel not only makes him more dangerous but also more abominable). So
the value of the conditionally valuable depends on the value of what conditions
it. Kant, like Raz, maintains that conditional values are ultimately conditioned by
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unconditional values. The intuition is that value is groundedthe value of things are
grounded in what is unconditionally valuable if they are of value at all.
Second, Kant is supposing the existence of an existent end (G 4:437). An existent
end is something that already exists and `whose existence is in itself an end' (G
4:428). Kant contrasts existent ends with ends to be eected. An end to be
eected is something that does not yet exist but can be brought about by action
(G 4:437). Notice that this contrast only makes sense if ends are are understood in
the broader and more fundamental sense of being that for the sake of which we act.
Existent ends must be things whose value grounds reasons that make it intelligible
that we treat them in certain ways.
Third, Kant is supposing the existence of something that has absolute worth.
The contrast might be with things with relative worth. So understood things
with absolute value would be ends in themselves. I believe, however, that Kant
means more than this. I believe that Kant is anticipating his deployment of the
Stoic distinction between dignity and price. (Compare Seneca's distinction between
dignitas and pretium.) Specically, Kant is supposing the existence of something with
dignity. The value of dignity is incomparable; it is a value that cannot be measured
against the value of anything else (G 4:434). An end with only relative worth, or
price, can be measured against the value of something else, and it would be rational
to trade it for something else of equivalent or greater value. It is in this sense that
Kant claims that absolute worth is `without limit'. It may be unclear in what sense
the value of something could be incomparably greater (since if it is greater there is
at least one sense in which it is comparable). Nevertheless, the idea is intelligible
and familiar outside of philosophy, say, when we refuse to sell at any price. It is
this feature of dignity, its incomparable value, that explains Kant's identication of
respect for the moral law with respect for people considered as ends in themselves.
Regarding the value of humanity as an object of comparison dishonors humanity.
Proper respect for humanity requires that one only compare one's conduct with the
moral law and not with the conduct of other rational beings.
These three features, being an end in itself, being an existent end, and having
absolute worth or dignity, are conceptually independent. Thus, for example, non
rational animals and features of the natural environment are existent endsalready
existing things for the sake of which we actbut are plausibly not ends in them
selves. Similarly, suppose the Messiah would only come if certain conditions were
achieved, the coming of the Messiah might be an end in itself and an end to be
eected, and so an end in itself need not be an existent end.
One aspect of their conceptual independence highlights the important role of
dignity in Kant's account. Notice that it is conceivable that an end in itself might
only have relative worth or price. This might seem inconsistent at rst, but consider
the following: Suppose that there was something whose value was unconditional,
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independent of inclination, and valid for all rational beings. But suppose as well that
the degree of this value was limited. It might be rational to trade it for something
with a greater degree of inclinationdependent value. This possibility is raised by
Raz's (2001) observation that the unconditional nature of a value is independent
of the stringency of the reasons it gives rise to. Kant implicitly recognizes this as
wellthe only thing that prevents this possibility in Kant's system is his contention
that humanity, in its selflegislative aspect, has dignity or absolute worth and hence
cannot be exchanged for a mere price. So the incomparable value of dignity not only
explains Kant's identication of respect for the moral law with respect for people
considered as ends in themselves, but it also explains the overriding character of
moral reasons since the value that grounds competing nonmoral reasons could only
be a price.
Despite their conceptual independence, Kant claims that only one thing has all
three featureshumanity or rational nature. That these features are united in
humanity is thus a synthetic claim.
4.3 TheDerivation
Supposing there is such a thing as an end in itself, what could it be? Kant's answer
has negative and positive stages.
In the negative stage of the argument, Kant considers three candidates and argues
that they are not ends in themselves. These are:
• Objects of inclination
• Inclinations themselves
• Nonrational beings
Objects of inclination could not be ends in themselves since their value is conditional
on the existence of the relevant inclination and so varies from one rational being to
another. The inclinations themselves are not valued simply as such any more than
their objects are. Moreover, even when we do value the objects of inclination, we
don't necessarily value the inclination considered as the source of that value. Since
ends in themselves could neither be the objects of inclination nor the inclinations
themselves, Kant infers that `the worth of any object to be acquired by our action
is always conditional' (G 4:428). Since an end in itself could not be an end to be
eected, it must be an existent end. Existent ends might be rational beings or
nonrational beings. Kant claims that the ordinary distinction between persons and
things presupposes that ends in themselves could not be nonrational beings. (This is
unconvincing, however. The ordinary distinction between persons and things may
presuppose that things are of lesser value than persons but this neither commits
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us to things being valued merely as means nor to persons being valued as ends in
themselves.)
If the objects of inclination, the inclinations themselves, and nonrational beings
are not ends in themselves, then what is? We know that ends in themselves must be
existent ends but could not be nonrational beings, so they must be rational beings.
Specically, an end in itself must be humanity or rational nature. While Kant cannot
demonstrate this, he argues that we necessarily, if implicitly, presuppose this:
The ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself.
The human being necessarily represents his own existence in this way;
so far it is thus a subjective principle of human actions. But every other
rational being also represents his existence in this way consequent on
just the same rational ground that also holds for me; thus it is at the
same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical
ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. The practical
imperative will therefore be the following: So act that you use humanity,
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the
same time as an end, never merely as a means. (G 4:4289)
The argument here is terse and dicult to interpret. The overall structure of
the argument is relatively clear; the main diculty is in interpreting the rst step.
It cannot be read as a contingent empirical claim about how people explicitly
value their own existence for so interpreted it would be falseunfortunately, some
people, in the grips of despair, regard their existence as worthless. So how are
we to understand Kant's claim that human beings necessarily represent their own
existence as an end in itself?
According toKant, our humanity or rational nature consists, at least in part, in our
capacity to set ends (G 4:437). Given this, Kant might be understood as claiming
that when we value the ends we set for ourselves, we must, implicitly at least, value
our capacity to set these ends whether or not we explicitly value this capacity in our
own person.
One inuential way of developing this idea is due to Korsgaard (1996). Korsgaard
understands Kant's reasoning here as a `regress on conditions'. We begin by observ
ing the value we place on the ends we set and then infer that this value is conferred
on these ends by the rational nature that sets them. Korsgaard's idea is, roughly,
that being the object of rational choice is the source of a thing's value. It is because
rational nature is the source of all goodness that it must be the fundamental object
of respect since if it is not respected as good, then nothing else can be valued as
good.
I won't reconstruct Korsgaard's interpretation, in part, because I do not fully
understand it (for an elaboration see Wood, 1999). More importantly, however, if
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Kant is moved by the `valueconferring status' of rational nature, then so much the
worse for the derivation, for the operative thought is simply false.
A person, in rationally adopting an end, must, implicitly at least, regard that end
as valuable, at least to some extent. (Perhaps only in the minimal sense that not
acting on that end would be more trouble than it is worth.) Indeed, the perceived
value of the end grounds the accepted reason that would render intelligible acting
on it, but it does not follow that the value of the end, if genuine, exists just because
one has adopted that end. Not only does the perceived value of the end ground the
person's reason to promote it, but it grounds what reason there was to adopt that
end in the rst place. The value of the end must be antecedent to its adoption. But
that means that no sense can be attached to the adoption of an end conferring value
upon it (see Scanlon, 2004).
Perhaps, the claim that the value of an end and the reasons it gives rise to exist
prior to its adoption is too extreme. Raz (2001) distinguishes the value of a thing
and its value for a person. My setting an endmay not confer value on that end, but it
might confer its value for me. If the end I set is genuinely worthwhile, then my life
goes better if I achieve it. Success or failure in achieving me ends (at least those that
are genuinely worthwhile) determines a standard by which my life goes better or
worse and aects in obvious ways the meaning or signicance of my life. Moreover,
insofar as the wellbeing of person is a reason for others to promote or at least not
interfere with it, then my adopting a valuable end, gives rise to a reason that did not
exist prior to my adoption of it. However, there are limits to the extent to which
my setting an end confers its value for me. Achieving an end is an element of a
person's wellbeing only if that end is genuinely worthwhile. So an end's value for a
person depends, in part, on the value of that end. Attributing to rational nature a
valueconferring status plausibly conates an end's value for a person for the value
of that end.
Is there a way to interpret the rst step of the derivation without invoking the
valueconferring status of rational nature?
The problem is to understand how we can move from the value of the adopted
end to the value of the capacity to adopt that end. Korsgaard's idea was that being
the object of rational choice is the source of a thing's value. We have seen reason
to doubt this idea. It might be that something is good only if it can be the object
of rational choice, but it does not follow that that thing is made good by being the
object of rational choice, that rational nature is the source of its value. An idea
of Raz's helps to see how this might be so. According to Raz, value is immanent:
Something is good only if it can be the object of rational choice in the sense that it
is only by being the object of rational choice that its value is realized. Novels are to
be read, music is to be listened to. It is not that unread novels are only of potential
value (the way they would be if being the object of rational choice were the source
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of their value), it is rather that in going unread their value is wasted. The existence
of a value does not depend on being the object of rational choice but its realization
does.
Raz's doctrine of value's immanence is the basis of, if not an altogether faithful
interpretation of the derivation, then a speculative reconstruction of it that is of
some independent interest. Value is immanent: In reading a novel, at least with
understanding and appreciation, its value is realized. Not only is the value of the
novel realized, but its realization is also good for the person who reads it. So a
person's capacity to set a valuable end is a condition not only for the the realization
of its value but for the good it aords the person who acts on it. Perhaps, then,
in implicitly valuing the ends he sets, a person is committed to valuing his capacity
to set them, since that capacity is a condition not only for their realization but the
good they aord him. Not only are we implicitly committed to valuing our capacity
to set ends, but so is every other rational being `on just the same ground'. So wemust
understand the value of rational nature as an objective value, valid for all rational
beings. If the value of rational nature does not depend on the value of anything else,
then this is well explained: Rational nature has a value valid for all rational beings
because the capacity to set an end is the fundamental condition for the realization
of all value and, as such, is a worthy object of respect:
But the lawgiving itself, which determines all worth, must for this very
reason have a dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth; and
the word respect alone provides a becoming expression for the estimate
of it that a rational being must give. (G 4:436)
Being the fundamental condition for the realization of all value explains, at least in
part, the incomparable value of human dignity. (I say at least in part because the full
account of what grounds the dignity of humanity involves our autonomous nature
as selflegislative members of the kingdom of ends and is ultimately rooted in our
noumenal natures.) All rational beings are ends in themselves and this makes an
objective claim on all rational beings to recognize themselves and others as ends
in themselves. This leads to the formulation of the categorical imperative as the
requirement to use humanity in every rational being always as an end and never only
as a means.
More needs to be said to fully develop this reasoning, butwhenproperly developed
it approaches Raz's argument of chapter four of Value, Respect, and Attachment.
4.4 OnNot Treating PeopleMerely as aMeans
If the moral content of the Formula of Humanity consists entirely in the injunction
to treat people as ends in themselves, then why emphasize that one should never
treat people merely as a means?
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The second half of the Formula of Humanity is not a general characterization of
wrongdoingScanlon's doubt is vindicated at least to that extent. However, it
purports to provide a general diagnosis of human wrongdoing (see Wood, 1999).
Human beings have a tendency to act contrary to duty, not because they altogether
fail to value humanity, but because they misconceive the kind of value it has. Thus,
as human beings, given our unsocial sociability, we have a tendency to place greater
value on the objects of inclination, which merely have a price or relative worth, over
the value of humanity, which has instead a dignity or absolute worth. In exchanging
the dignity of humanity for a mere price, we treat humanity merely as a means.
This both complements and illuminates the sense in which the Formula of Uni
versal Law (A`ct only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the
same time will that it become a universal law'. G 4:421; 4:402) is meant to be a
moral `compass' (G 4:404):
If we now attend to ourselves in any transgression of duty, we nd that we
do not really will that our maxim should become a universal law, since
that is impossible for us, but that the opposite of our maxim should
instead remain a universal law, only we take the liberty of making an
exception to it for ourselves (or just for this once) to the advantage of
our inclination. Consequently, if we weighed all cases from one and the
same point of view, namely that of reason, we would nd a contradiction
in our own will, namely that a certain principle be objectively necessary
as a universal law and yet subjectively not hold universally but allow
exceptions. (G 4:424)
Thus, when tempted to make false promises when in need of money, we do not
will that everyone should make false promises when in need of money. Rather if
we succumb to temptation, we will that in general people truly promise only that
we, just this once, falsely promise to repay a creditor. So in acting contrary to
duty, a person gives unjustiable preference to his own needs and inclinations over
the needs and inclinations of other nite rational beings. The rst formula is a
moral compass for those lost to temptation, not in the sense that it provides a
mechanical algorithm for deriving more specic duties, but as a vivid reminder not
to give unjustied preference to one's own needs and inclinations over the needs and
inclinations of other nite rational beings, and hence as a corrective to our human
propensity to make exceptions for ourselves to universal moral principles.
Notice that, when we make an exception for ourselves, we fail to express proper
respect for the dignity of humanity in ourselves or in the person of another. In
making an exception for ourselves, we sacrice the dignity of humanity for a mere
price and, hence, fail to properly respect that dignity. Indeed, Kant anticipates this
explicit connection when in the rst section of the Groundwork he observes that
human beings possess:
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. . . a propensity to rationalize against those strict laws of duty and to
cast doubt upon their validity, or at least upon their purity and strictness,
and where possible, to make them better suited to our wishes and incli
nations, that is, to corrupt them at their basis and to destroy all their
dignity [my emphasis]something that even common rational cognition
cannot, in the end, call good. (G 4:405)
Thus a tendency to misconceive the value of humanity explains a propensity to
make exceptions for ourselves to universal moral principles to the advantage of
inclination.
How might we resist temptation and avoid corruption?
We all more or less know right from wrong even if we are tempted to make excep
tions for ourselves. Specically, we are equipped with common rational moral
cognitionprereective, practical knowledge of the moral law. Nevertheless,
philosophical inquiry is required to gain reective, theoretical knowledge of the
moral law. Just as wisdom has need of science not to learn from it but to gain
durability and access to its principles, common rational moral cognition has need
of philosophy not to learn from it but to gain durability and access to its princi
ples. Thus common rational moral cognition can recognize a practical motive to
engage in the philosophical reection that Kant pursues in the second section of
the Groundwork. There, Kant argues that whereas the rst formula is best for the
appraisal of action, for access to the moral law the three formulas should be applied
to one and the same action thereby bringing the moral law closer to intuition and
thereby feeling.
While it is not yet clear what Kant means by `access to the moral law', Kant is
at least claiming this much: With the rst formula as an external aid, a person has
sucient means to act in conformity with duty. But by gaining access to the moral
law thereby bringing it closer to intuition and thereby feeling, a person forms a
strong desire to act from duty even though there is no positive inclination to do so
or a strong inclination to act contrary to duty. In forming such a desire, common
rational moral cognition ensures the durability of its principle.
The durability of a principle is a matter of the degree and stability of its causal
inuence. The increased durability of the moral law in a person's conduct is ex
plained as follows: In intuiting the dignity of humanity, the value of objects of
inclination pale in comparison if indeed they are experienced to be of value at all.
The intuition of human dignity gives rise to a distinctive moral pleasure, the feeling
of respect. Together they constitute the pure desire to act from duty since a desire
just is the representation of an object accompanied by a feeling of pleasure. What's
represented in intuition is the grounds of the reasons for acting from duty, and the
feeling of respect is a conscious manifestation of the value of the intuited dignity.
It is not possible to respect the dignity of humanity and to take pleasure in the
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fulllment of an inclination contrary to dutythe feeling of respect precludes such
pleasures. This is a way in which the incomparable value of dignity is consciously
manifest to the person who intuits it. From this perspective, the perspective of a
virtuous sensibility, inclinations contrary to duty do not seem to be reasons and so
are motivationally inecacious. Moreover, since the pure desire does not depend
on inclination for its object, it can operate even in the absence of positive inclina
tion. The pure desire to act from duty thus plays an important explanatory role in
the motivational psychology of a virtuous sensibility, even though it is a response to
reasons and not their source.
The knowledge common rational moral cognition gains through philosophical
reection is a kind of selfknowledge. It is not knowledge of right and wrong, that
we more or less already have, but knowledge of what we desire as free and rational
beings. This is a manifestation of Kant's Pietist background. Kant is looking for a
reasonable form of moral reection to check the purity of our motives. This form
of moral reection is practically necessary since, without it, we are easily tempted
to act from wrong reasons.
In acting from duty, a virtuous person does so out of a phenomenologically vivid
sense of the value that grounds the reasons for so acting. It is this phenomenologi
cally vivid sense of the value of humanity that Kant experiences in reading Rousseau
(and that presumably `wrenches' the philanthropist from his `wretched insensibil
ity' G 4:398). Kant has not altogether abandoned the moral sentimentalism of
his youth. Indeed, his remarks about the practical interest in the moral law can
be understood as a (partial) interpretation of Butler's (1736) gloss on moral sense:
Insofar as the intuition of a virtuous sensibility takes as its object the value that
grounds our duty it is a `perception of the heart'; insofar as the feeling of respect is
part of the noncognitive response to the reasons grounded in this valueinsofar as
it is `selfwrought from reason' (G 4:401n)it is a `sentiment of the understanding'.
5 Conclusion
Let me summarize the main points so far:
• Respect is not a feeling, it is a way of treating people. The feeling of respect is
part of the noncognitive response to the reasons there are for such treatment.
While the feeling of respect is part of the response to these reasons and
not their source, it nevertheless plays an important explanatory role in the
motivational psychology of a virtuous sensibility.
• What is the object of respectthe moral law or people considered as ends in
themselves? Kant is best understood as proposing a substantive identication:
Respect for the moral law just is respect for people considered as ends in
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themselves. This is a consequence of the kind of value that people enjoythe
dignity of humanity is incomparable.
• People could be ends only in the fundamental sense of that for the sake of
which we act. To act for the sake of something is to suppose that thing has a
value that grounds reasons that make intelligible your so acting. What makes
people ends and indeed ends in themselves is the dignity of humanity.
• Humanity or rational nature is the fundamental condition for the realization
of all value but not by being its source. Being the fundamental condition for
the realization of all value explains, at least in part, the incomparable value of
human dignity.
On the present interpretation, Kant is no formalistour duties are grounded, not in
the formof practical deliberation, but in a substantive value that grounds the reasons
that are the subject matter of practical deliberation. Nor is Kant a constructivist
the value of an end and the reasons it grounds exist prior to its adoption, and so the
adoption of an end could not be their source.
There are clear ways in which Kant's views can be improved that Raz's discussion
brings to light. To take just one example, on Kant's view, what's not and end in itself
is valuable only insofar as it is a potential end for a rational beingit merely has
relative worth. In eect, Kant makes no allowances for intrinsic, noninstrumental
value that is not valuable in itself. This failure is responsible, in part, for Kant
implausibly identifying the whole of morality with what Gibbard (1990) describes
as `morality in the narrow sense' and what Scanlon (1998) describes as the domain of
`whatwe owe to each other'. Specically, it leads him to analyze duties to nonrational
beings such as animals and features of the natural environment as duties owed to
persons. But this is implausible. The reason it is impermissible to pave over the
Grand Canyon on a whim is not, or not merely, that it would spoil the view for
other human beings. To suppose otherwise would be to mistake the value of an
aweinspiring view (the importance for a person of experiencing the Grand Canyon
rst hand) for the value that makes its view aweinspiring (its unserveyability, the
perilous perspective that its view aords). As Raz argues, instrumental and intrinsic
value dier: What makes something instrumentally valuable is its use for a person's
ends; what makes something intrinsically valuable are its goodmaking features.
That things are intrinsically valuable provides us with a better understanding of our
duties to nonrational beings. They are not duties owed to persons; they are duties
owed to valuable things. Moreover, duties to nonrational beings are categorical, at
least in the sense of being independent of inclination, if not in the sense of providing
overriding reasons.
Value plays dierent roles in Kant and Raz's accounts of respect. For Kant, the
source of disrespect is a failure to properly conceive the value of a person. For Raz,
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the source of disrespect is a failure to recognize or at least acknowledge the value
of a thing. These are distinct, if not incompatible accountsindeed they may be
complementary. Failure to acknowledge value may be one source of disrespect, and
misconceiving the value of things may be another.
It is yet unclear why the value of dignity should necessarily override price. As
Raz emphasizes, that there are overriding reasons is a substantive and controversial
claim that should be explained if true. Kant's full account of what grounds the
dignity of humanity involves our autonomous nature as selflegislative members of
the kingdom of ends and is ultimately rooted in our noumenal natures. Few may be
willing to follow Kant so far. There are several reasons for this, not least of which is
unclarity about Kant's dualism concerning our phenomenal and noumenal natures.
There is, however, a moral point to this doctrine easily obscured by this unclarity. In
claiming that the dignity of humanity is grounded in our noumenal nature, Kant is, in
part, making a claim about our experience of that dignity. Our experience of human
dignity is an experience of a value that is unconditional, independent of inclination,
and universally valid, that is absolute andwithout limitation and hence incomparably
greater than anything (individually or in aggregate) whose value is grounded in the
phenomenal. In emphasizing our noumenal nature, Kant is at least claiming that our
experience of this value is, fundamentally, a religious experience. It is an experience
of something whose value transcends what is phenomenally grounded, thatmakes us
equal to God, and is akin to the awe inspired by the contemplation of the heavens:
Two things ll the mind . . . with admiration and awe . . . the starry heav
ens above me and the moral law within me. (KpV 5:161f )
This moral phenomenology is obscured not only by theoretical unclarity, but
also by religious skepticism. Contemporary religious skepticism comprises, among
other things, important and apt criticisms of intelligent design, and doubts about
the morally malign inuence of religion in our cultural confrontations with others.
That religious skeptics should be less sensitive to the relevant phenomenology and its
potential signicance is unsurprising, if perhaps unreasonable. Kant, while a deeply
religious thinker, was also, importantly, a committed anticleric. But priestcraft is
one thing, religious experience another. Thus, for example, Kant would maintain
that if religious practice had a propensity to increase our mutual hostility, it would
be the religion of false idolsit would be the radical evil of human nature, our
unsocial sociability, masquerading as a manifestation of the divine. (So understood,
it would be the kind of malign moral ctionalism described in chapter four of my
2005.) True religion, involving the operation of free reason, enjoins equal respect
for all humanity because of its absolute and unlimited value, a value shared with a
divine nature.
To the religious skeptic Kant might retort that the increasingly secular character
of modernity has eroded our capacity for awe and other theological sentiments
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with the consequence that we tend to misconceive the value of their objects. This
is manifest, in part, in a widespread misconception of the value of equalityin
taking the value of an egalitarian distribution, in circumstances where it is genuinely
valuable, to be grounded in its abstract structure rather than the nature of its
recipients, contemporary egalitarians mistake the impartial value of equality for an
impersonal value (seeRawls 1971, section thirty, andMunozDardé 2005). It is also
manifest in mistake about the extent of aggregation. Kant's view is that aggregation
fails of value generally but holds only of a kind of value, since there are things that
may not be exchanged for a price. One can deny that all value is aggregative and
yet concede that aggregation holds for the prototype of Kantian price, economic
value, and perhaps other forms of value as well. From this perspective, aggregative
theories of the general nature of value represent an overgeneralization of a special
casea claim for which Raz (2000, 2001) independently argues.
Table 1: Abbreviations
Ak Immanuel Kants SchriftenWritings of Immanuel Kant
G Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten Groundwork of the metaphysics
of morals 1785
KpV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft Critique of practical reason 1788
KU Kritik der Urteilskraft Critique of the power of judgment 1790
MA Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte Conjectural beginnings of
human history 1786
MS Metaphysik der SittenMetaphysics of morals 17978
VE Vorlesungen über Ethik Lectures on ethics
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